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Product Safety Act
Congress on the Consumer Bandwagon:
The Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972
On March 27, 1968, President Lyndon Johnson appointed a seven-man,
bipartisan National Commission on Product Safety (NCPS) to "conduct a
comprehensive study and investigation of the scope and adequacy of measures
now employed to protect consumers against unreasonable risk of injuries
which may be caused by hazardous household products."' After more than
two years of study, the NCPS found that 20 million Americans are injured
annually in the home as a result of using consumer products. Of that total,
110,000 are permanently disabled, and 30,000 are killed. These product-
related injuries exceed an annual cost of $5.5 billion.2
The NCPS also found that the federal government had no central authority
to establish minimum standards or to ban dangerous items, but instead at-
tempted to curb those hazards "in narrow product categories" '3 resulting in
selective, piecemeal regulation. Furthermore, the states were prevented by
jurisdictional limitations from exercising broad control over the manufacturing
and distribution of consumer goods, and the courts were more involved
with postinjury remedies than with preventive control.
As a result of these findings, the NCPS recommended the "establishment
of an independent Consumer Product Safety Commission ' 4 to be supported
by federal funds. The insistence on an independent agency grew out of a
concern that subordination to a larger existing agency would cause "the
emphasis on consumer safety . . . to suffer." 5  The powers to be delegated
to the proposed Commission included the following: to establish mandatory
consumer product safety standards; to seek injunctions against products
which create an "unreasonable risk to the safety of the public;" to hold
public hearings on consumer products; and to establish testing laboratories
and conduct safety research. The NCPS also suggested the appointment of
a "Consumer Safety Advocate' 7 to present consumer complaints before the
1. Pub. L. No. 90-146, § 2(a) (Nov. 20, 1967).
2. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FINAL REPORT 1 (1970).
3. Id. at 2. Legislation authorized control only over products which presented an
immediate danger to the consumer, such as flammable fabrics, toys, automobiles, drugs,
cosmetics, etc.
4. Id. at 113.
5. Id. at 114.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 115.
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agency, and allowances for class actions, as well as treble damages, for
consumers injured as a result of violations of safety standards.
I. Legislative Background
The question of the proposed Commission's status as an independent agency
became the focal point of debate between proponents of the NCPS report
and the Nixon administration. In a message to the 92d Congress, President
Nixon called for "broad Federal authority for comprehensive regulation
of hazardous consumer products."'8 This authority would be vested within
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), and would
provide for "full participation on the part of private organizations and
groups in the development of standards."
In July, 1971, the Senate Committee on Commerce began hearings on the
Magnuson bill, S. 983,10 which essentially adopted the recommendations of
the NCPS, and S. 1797, the Nixon administration bill."' In April, 1972,
the Committee reported out a "clean" bill, S. 3419, on which hearings were
held by two other Senate committees before passage on June 21, 1972.12
On November 1, 1971, the House Subcommittee on Commerce and
Finance began thirteen days of hearings on eleven similar bills 3 which at-
tempted to regulate hazardous consumer products. The hearings centered
on the administration bill, H.R. 8110,14 and the counterpart of the NCPS
8. Message from Richard M. Nixon to the 92d Congress, Feb. 24, 1971. See also
special message from President Nixon to the 91st Congress, Oct. 30, 1969, urging
Congress to design a program around a "Buyer's Bill of Rights;" and message on
consumer affairs from President Lyndon B. Johnson to the 90th Congress, Feb. 16,
1967.
9. Id.
10. See SENATE COMMERCE COMM. PRINT ONE AND Two ON' THE CONSUMER
SAFETY ACT, 92D CONG., 1ST & 2D SEss. (1972). The bill followed essentially the
same format as S. 4054 introduced by Senators Warren Magnuson (D-Wash.) and
Frank Moss (D-Utah) during the 91st Congress. Nothing of substance was accom-
plished during that session. No committee action was taken, and, therefore, no
product safety bill made it to either floor of COngress.
11. Id. The bill was introduced, by request, by Senator Magnuson.
12. Hearings were held by the Senate Government Operations Committee and the
Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee. See S. REP. No. 92-749, 92D CONG.,
2D SESS. (1972). See also Hearings on S. 3419 Before the Subcomm. on Health of
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), and the
report of the full committee, S. REP. No. 92-835, 92D CONG., 2D SESs. (1972); and
Hearings on S. 3419 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Government Opera-
tions, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The final vote in the Senate was 69-10. 188
CONG. REC. 9932 (daily ed., June 21, 1972).
13. See Hearings on H.R. 8110, H.R. 8157, etc. Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Pts 1, 2, & 3 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
(1971-72) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
14. Introduced, by request, by Rep. Harley Staggers (D-W. Va.).
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report, H.R. 8157.15 The subcommittee reported out H.R. 15003, which
assimilated major aspects of both bills, to the full committee. The House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce reported favorably on the
bill with certain amendments. 16 H.R. 15003 was sent to another committee
before passage on September 20, 1972.17 The House-Senate Conference
Report was agreed to,' 8 and, despite speculation that it would be vetoed, the
President signed the bill on October 27, 1972.19
Virginia Knauer, Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs,
hailed the measure as
[O]ne of the most significant pieces of consumer legislation any
President has ever signed. . . . The new regulatory authority will
be flexible enough to stimulate product safety advances in the
private sector, yet firm enough to ban from the marketplace those
products which present unacceptable dangers to the American
consumer.
20
Congressman John Moss, one of the House sponsors of the bill, called it a
"milestone" 21 in federal consumer legislation.
Beneath the enthusiastic response to the new law lay a history of deep
divisions of opinion as to the basic structure of the new agency, its purpose,
function, and power. The new measure reflected, as most laws do, a
series of differences, amendments, and ultimate compromises which produced
what nearly everyone agreed was sorely needed: a federal response to hazard-
ous consumer products. How strong and effective that response would be
became the ultimate issue between the supporters of the NCPS report and
the administration.
15. Introduced by Rep. John E. Moss (D-Calif.). Rep. John Murphy (D-N.Y.)
reintroduced a NCPS bill, H.R. 260, in the House on January 22, 1971. That bill
adopted the same features as H.R. 18208, introduced in the 91st Congress by Rep.
James O'Hara (D-Mich.), but no action was taken. See generally supra note 10.
These bills all followed the NCPS guidelines and recommendations.
16. See H.R. REP. No. 92-1153, 92D CONG., 2D SESS. (1972).
17. The House Committee on Rules sent the bill to the floor where it was passed
319-50. 118 CONG. REC. 8607 (daily ed., Sept. 20, 1972).
18. See H.R. REP. No. 92-1593, 92D CONG., 2D SEss. (1972). The Senate came out
with very little of its bill remaining in the final form.
19. The Washington Post, Oct. 29, 1972, at A20, col. 2, reported:
The administration vigorously opposed establishing a separate independent
agency for [consumer] products. [HEW] Secretary Elliot A. Richardson
reportedly recommended a veto of the bill because it set up a new agency
instead of giving HEW jurisdiction.
The bill became Pub. L. No. 92-573 [hereinafter cited as Act].
20. See press release of Virginia Knauer, Office of Consumer Affairs, Oct. 28, 1972,
on file in C.U. Law Review office. See also statement by President Nixon, Oct. 28,
1972, also on file.
21. Washington Post, supra note 19.
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II. The New Product Safety Commission: Consolidation
or Independence?
The administration's approach to protecting the consumer against hazardous
products consisted of a "consumer product safety program which shall
include the promulgation and enforcement of product safety standards 22
established and directly controlled by the Secretary of HEW. This consoli-
dation, the administration argued, would be more economical and practicable
since HEW already had laboratories and professional expertise in the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), and needless proliferation could, therefore,
be avoided. Testifying before the House Subcommittee on Commerce and
Finance, former Secretary of HEW, Elliot Richardson, envisaged a consoli-
dated federal structure to implement the needs of consumers:
Enactment of the President's reorganization proposals, by trans-
ferring these, as well as other product safety programs, to a new
Department of Human Resources, would further consolidate con-
sumer protection responsibility in a single Federal entity. 23
Critics of the administration's approach focused their attacks on the failures
of FDA,24 and warned that consolidation within HEW would condemn the
22. H.R. 8110, p.2 .
23. House Hearings 973. Although the administration portrayed HEW as ready
to undertake a consumer product safety program, it became clear that such an under-
taking would be a first step toward a plan to consolidate all existing federal programs
under a single agency at some indefinite point in the future:
Secretary Richardson. This legislation, whether hazardous substances or the
Flammable Fabrics Act, is established and is, in some cases, getting underway
more effectively.
Mr. Eckhardt. It seems to me, Mr. Secretary, that the flammable sub-
stances are so closely related to hazardous products it seems difficult for me
to reconcile your statement that there is a need for consolidation with a rec-
ommendation that consolidation not be accomplished.
Secretary Richardson . . . I was trying to say that we think that there should
be a period of time in which, with this new legislation [the administration
bill], the responsibility over other consumer products should remain as it is
under existing legislation, looking toward a future date . . . to consolidate
responsibility.
Mr. Eckhardt. Then you would favor the principle of consolidating that
function in some agency, ... but you would simply not recommend it at
this time, is that correct?
Secretary Richardson. Yes, that is correct.
House Hearings 1045-46.
24. Congressional reluctance to extend additional responsibilities to FDA stems, in
part, from a series of recent studies which were sharply critical of the agency's abili-
ties to carry out the duties already assigned to it. Principal among these studies, re-
printed in House Hearings, are: the Kinslow report of July, 1969, which offered an
analysis of FDA's consumer protection objectives and programs, House Hearings 1025;
followed by a departmental review of FDA in July, 1969, the Malek report, House
Hearings 982; and ending in May, 1971 with the Ritts Committee report which re-
viewed FDA's "total scientific effort," in House Hearings 986. "Each of these studies
identified structural shortcomings in FDA, citing inadequacies in internal procedures
[Vol. 22: 847
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new program to the same fate. Arnold Elkind, former Chairman of the
NCPS, testified:
[O]ne must conclude that a delegation to [HEW] would predictably
fail to be effective in raising the quality of consumer protection
from product hazards.
It is frustrating to find that the administration desires to bury this
new consumer activity with the very people who have had such a
poor track record .... 25
NCPS bill supporters called for an independent agency free from political
pressures.20  The full House committee agreed, 27 and provided in § 4 of
H.R. 15003 for a five-man Commission appointed by the President 28 with
Senate approval, each to serve for a seven-year term. Section 4(a) insulated
the members from partisan politics by providing for removal only for neglect
of duty or malfeasance in office. Section 5 authorized the Commission to
conduct research, investigate, analyze and disseminate information relating
to hazardous consumer products, and to promulgate mandatory consumer
product safety standards.
The Senate Commerce Committee also approved of the NCPS' recom-
mendation for an independent agency, 29 but provided for a different organi-
zational structure in its bill. The new agency would be headed by an
administrator, appointed by the President with Senate approval, for a five-
year term. The administrator would be the coordinator and chief overseer
of the agency, and would be limited by only one reappointment. Besides
the administrator, four commissioners would be appointed to serve at the
pleasure of the President, with approval by the Senate. Each commissioner
could conduct public hearings, have subpoena power, and generally carry
out the purposes of the Act in coordination with the rest of the agency.
and organization. Following each study, the prescription has been for more money
and manpower and for reorganization." H.R. REP. No. 92-1153, 92D CONG., 2D SESS.
25 (1972). See also the Heffron report, written for the National Commission on
Product Safety, which studied then-existing federal regulations on consumer product
safety, House Hearings 535.
25. House Hearings 304.
26. Ralph Nader told the House subcommittee: "The higher visibility of a vigor-
ous new independent agency is necessary to create consumer confidence in product
safety." House Hearings 887. Among consumer groups to support an independent
agency were the Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union of the United
States, and the National Consumers League (see House Hearings 1325-326). See also
Chamber of Commerce statement opposing a new agency, House Hearings 1316-320.
27. See H.R. REP. No. 92-1153, 92D CONG., 2D SESS. 24-26 (1972).
28. See the editorial in the Washington Post, Mar. 7, 1973, at A26, cols. 1 & 2,
urging President Nixon to hasten the nomination of Commission members. The Presi-
dent named four Commissioners on May 14, 1973. They are: Richard 0. Simpson,
Chairman; Constance Newman, Lawrence M. Kushner, and Barbara Franklin, Com-
missioners.
29. S. REP. No. 92-749, 92D CONG., 2D SESS. 1 (1972).
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Although the Senate bill subjected the commissioners to serve at the
whim of the President, it did provide for more far-reaching authority by
transferring the functions of FDA to the new agency, something which the
House bill avoided and completely the opposite of what the administration
wanted. This advantage was lost, however, in the conference report with
the agreement to accept the House provisions on the composition and author-
ity of the new Commission.3 0
Once it became clear that Congress intended to create an independent
agency, the controversy settled on which functions should be transferred
to it. Besides transferring FDA to the new agency, the Senate bill also
included the food inspection authority of the Department of Agriculture.
That provision, however, had to be deleted on the floor by one of the bill's
sponsors to prevent delay in passage.a' The House bill only transferred the
functions of HEW under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, the Poison
Prevention Packaging Act, and the Flammable Fabrics Act, all included in
the Senate bill as well. The House's cautious, wait-and-see approach was
adopted,' 2 with certain consumer items explicitly exempted from the Com-
mission's control.33
The novel idea of a Consumer Safety Advocate was dropped because of
the expected passage of the Consumer Protection Act which also provided
for a consumer ombudsman.8 4 Emphasis is placed instead on private initiative
to effectuate the purposes of the Act.
III. Establishment and Enforcement of Product Safety Standards
A. Rule-making Procedures
The Commission's authority to promulgate safety standards raises questions
as to the proper procedure to be used in adopting them, the scope of participa-
tion by the private sector (both consumer groups and industry) during the
development period, and the procedures involved in compelling compliance.
Section 7 of the Act outlines the development of the standards; it commences
with notice that a safety standard is necessary for a given consumer product
to reduce the risk of injury, and includes a provision which invites any
30. See H.R. REP. No. 92-1593, 92D CONG., 2D SEss. 32-33 (1972).
31. Senator Frank Moss felt compelled "with no great joy" to delete the amendment
of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and the Committee on Government
Operations since it "would greatly delay the bill before us, while we discussed the
matter in committee and held hearings and later had to come to the floor." 118
CONG. REc. 9883 (daily ed., June 21, 1972).
32. See Conference Report, supra note 30, at 35-36.
33. The Commission would not have authority over tobacco products, motor ve-
hicles, aircraft, boats, pesticides, food, drugs, and cosmetics. See Act § 3 (a) (1).
34. See 118 CONG. REc. 8570 (daily ed., Sept. 20, 1972).
[Vol. 22:847
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interested party to offer an existing standard or develop one. The Commission
may also accept an existing standard without inviting an offer. If the
Commission accepts a development offer, it may contribute funds to the of-
feror's cost in developing the safety standard. During the development
period, the Commission must provide notice and opportunity for participation
by other interested parties, including consumer groups. The Act is unclear,
however, as to how interested parties may participate in the developmental
process once an offer has been accepted.
B. Commission Standards
The Commission is authorized to promulgate its own standard if an offer to
develop one is not accepted within thirty days after the notice of proceedings
provided in § 7(b). This provision allows the Commission wide discretion
in the selection of offerors. If the Commission determines that an offeror is
not making satisfactory progress in developing a standard, it may issue its
own standard or appoint a new third party; or if a sole offeror is accepted
who happens to be too closely connected to the product, the Commission
can develop its own proposals for a standard during the development period.
Otherwise, the Commission cannot issue a safety standard during that
time. The Act requires publication of a proposed standard or withdrawal of
notice of proceedings within 210 days, unless the period is extended for
"good cause" by the Commission.
C. The Ban and Imminent Hazards
In extraordinary circumstances, the Commission may, under §8 of the Act,
ban a product which presents an unreasonable risk of injury when no
"feasible" safety standard can be developed or applied. However, this ban
cannot take effect until after the appropriate administrative proceedings
of § § 7 and 9 take place. These banned products, as well as other products
in violation of the Act, may then be seized by application to the district
court for the jurisdiction in which they are located. The proceedings "shall
conform as nearly as possible to proceedings in rem in admiralty." 35
Section 12, on the other hand, authorizes the Commission to disregard
administrative proceedings in actions against imminently hazardous products.
Rather than acting with the approval of the Attorney General, as other pro-
visions of the Act require, including the banning provision of § 8, the Com-
mission may sue in district court using its own attorneys. However, the sup-
posed intent of §12 to allow speedy action when necessary, is hampered by
the requirement that judicial proceedings occur before acting against such
35. Act, § 22(b).
1973]
Catholic University Law Review
imminently hazardous products. Consumer groups argued that the Com-
mission should have the authority to declare a product an imminent hazard
with judicial review after the administrative action. Two prominent con-
sumer advocates, Ralph Nader and Judy Jackson, made the following
arguments before the House subcommittee:
Miss Jackson. . . . The problem is that courts notoriously, in the
consumer safety area, have been unwilling to grant injunctions.
You may run into problems getting the Justice Department to go
in and get one.
So I think it is most important that there be an ability in the agency
itself, and I think, particularly from the standpoint of dealing with
the situation quickly for extreme hazards, to be able to go in and
administratively ban a product and then put the burden on the
manufacturer to come in and show wherein the agency was wrong in
doing that ...
Mr. Nader. The Toy Safety Act, for example, has enabled the
HEW [sic] to put out a banned list of toys, and if you see the length
of that list, you can imagine the difficulty of going to the Justice
Department to obtain injunctions for 200 different kinds of toys.3 1
D. Rule Promulgation and Stockpiling
Section 9 provides that within sixty days after the safety standard has been
proposed in accordance with § 7, the Commission shall promulgate the ap-
plicable rule, still allowing for oral or written arguments from interested
parties before the rule's effective date. The effective date of the new
safety rule begins not less than thirty nor more than 180 days after promul-
gation. 37  The rule would not apply to affected products manufactured
before the effective date, and this provision caused some consideration to
be given to the possibility that a forewarned manufacturer would step-up
production and stockpile the product to avoid the reach of the Act. Section
9(d) (2) gives the Commission power to prohibit a manufacturer, including
importers, 38 from stockpiling any product between the date of promulgation
of the safety rule and its effective date if it can show that production during
36. House Hearings 911.
37. Congressman Staggers successfully amended § 9(d) allowing at least thirty
days before an effective date could be set after promulgation "to be sure that they
have time in which to amend their practices." 119 CONG. REC. 8592 (daily ed.,
Sept. 20, 1972). Thus, a loophole could have been exploited were it not for § 9(d)
(2).
38. The Act's reach extends to imports which do not comply with its provisions
(§ 17(a) ), but not to exports (§ 18). The fact that American manufacturers may
ship abroad products deemed unsafe at home is defended on the grounds that the
United States should not hamper competition in foreign countries which do not take
the trouble to promulgate their own safety standards. See discussion in the House on
this point, 119 CONG. REc. 8598-599 (daily ed., Sept. 20, 1972).
[Vol. 22:847
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that time exceeded that of a normal base period. The provision on stock-
piling came essentially from the Senate bill, as there was no comparable House
provision.3 9
E. New Products Clearance
Of considerable concern to the administration and some congressmen was
the question of procedure in developing safety standards for new products
ready to be marketed. They questioned the need of giving the Commission
power, in effect, to grant a premarket clearance for new products. The
applicable provision, §13, sparked some debate on the House floor over the
fundamental authority of the Commission to regulate new products, and the
liability of businessmen, including retailers, who may unknowingly be caught
in the broad sweep of the Act.40  But the basic approach of the Act is to
attempt to balance the rights of private industry with the need to protect
innocent consumers without destroying business incentive. To accomplish
this, the Act provides for an extended timetable for establishing a final
product safety rule-always allowing for maximum input from any interested
party.
IV. Private Initiative and Judicial Review
The Act relies heavily on participation by interested persons to achieve a
meaningful control over consumer products. Section 10 permits any inter-
ested party to petition the Commission to initiate a proceeding for the
"issuance, amendment, or revocation of a consumer product safety rule."
'41
39. See Conference Report, supra note 30, at 46.
40. Mr. STAGGERS. . . .all a manufacturer would be required to do is just
give a description and describe the intended use of the article and it can be
put on the market ....
Mr. DENNIS. I understand, Mr. Chairman, that you do not have this to
the place where a man has to have permission before he can sell; you have
not gone that far. You have only taken the first step. He has got to give
notice before he sells. I expect that maybe in a year or two from now we
will be back here with a bill which makes a precondition. That is what I
am worried about, the first step forward.
Mr. BROYHILL of North Carolina. . . . All this section does is provide a
means for the Commission to keep informed about what is going on in the
area of new products. That is all.
Mr. LLOYD. Even though he [the manufacturer] does not know of this
new provision requiring that notice be given to the Commission, he will be
subject to a civil fine?
Mr. STAGGERS. If he can prove that [i.e. lack of knowledge], I am sure
he would not be subjected to the fine ....
118 CoNG. REc. 8567 (daily ed., Sept. 20, 1972).
41. Act, § 10(a).
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If the Commission denies the petition, the petitioner may commence an action
in the federal district courts seeking to compel the Commission to initiate
the rule-making proceedings of §§ 7 or 8. The Act also allows any
"interested person" 42 to seek an injunction in the district courts to compel
compliance with the safety rule or §15 43 as long as notice is given to the
Attorney General and the Commission.
Once a safety rule is promulgated and becomes effective, an aggrieved
party may appeal to the circuit courts for review of the safety rule which
can then be set aside in whole or in part. Moreover, instead of placing the
the burden upon the aggrieved party (i.e. the manufacturer or distributor)
to show that the safety standard or banning order was arbitrary or capricious,
the traditional grounds for court review, the Congress has required that the
Commission support its action by "substantial evidence."'44
A. Penalties
Section 19 lists conduct prohibited by the Act, and § § 20 and 21 provide civil
and criminal penalties respectively. The Commission may petition the district
courts, with the concurrence of the Attorney General, to enjoin any viola-
tions of the Act. In order to be convicted of a violation of the Act, it must
be shown that the accused "knowingly" committed the violation. 45
B. Private Suits
Any person injured by reason of a violation of a product safety rule may sue
in the district courts as long as as the $10,000 jurisdictional amount is met.
Initially, there was no provision for the jurisdictional amount, but an amend-
ment was offered and passed after considerable debate on the House floor, 46
and it was retained in the final bill. The amendment was probably passed to
allay concern that product safety standards would encourage consumers to
litigate, and subject industry and the courts to frivolous suits.
Section 25(a) and (b) make it clear that compliance with a product
safety rule shall not relieve the defendant of liability in a civil suit for dam-
ages, and no evidence can be introduced to show that the Commisison failed
to take any action on the product. If the plaintiff proves noncompliance,
however, a question arises as to whether the Act's requirement of a "know-
ing" violation would have any application in strict liability jurisdictions which
do not even require a showing of negligence. Also unresolved is the problem
42. Id.
43. See discussion of § 15 in text infra.
44. Act, § 9(c).
45. See exchange supra note 40.




of whether noncompliance could establish a prima facie case, obviating the
necessity of showing a product defect in proving negligence. The intent of
§ 25(a) 47 therefore, is somewhat ambiguous and troublesome. It would
seem that a court, in its discretion, could allow evidence that showed com-
pliance with a safety standard to demonstrate adequate care or to rebut plain-
tiff's allegation of noncompliance. Such evidence of compliance, if ad-
missible, could well "relieve any person from liability at common law,"'48 un-
less the plaintiff also proved negligence.
Originally, the NCPS had specifically recommended that evidence showing
compliance be inadmissible except in actions to recover treble damages. 49
The unequivocal language of the NCPS' recommendation was not adopted,
however, nor was the treble damages provision which some considered an ef-
fective deterrent to violations of the Act.50
C. Other Provisions
The Commission has broad power under § 14 to require testing of products
and certification that a given consumer item conforms to an applicable product
safety rule. The burden is on the manufacturer or private labeler to issue a
compliance certificate to the distributor or retailer. This certificate saves any
person from prosecution for violations of §19, unless there is proof that the
person knew the product was nonconforming. Again, it is not clear whether
such certificates can be introduced in civil trials.
Section 15 empowers the Commission to force manufacturers, distributors,
and retailers to give notice to the public that the product is defective (creating
a "substantial risk of injury"), or fails to comply with applicable safety rules.
This section also allows the offending party to elect to bring the product into
conformity, replace the product, or refund the purchase price. Section 16
allows designated employees of the Commission to inspect both the facilities
where consumer products are manufactured or held, and the records kept by
the company showing compliance with the Act. 5'
The Commission is required under § 28 to establish a fifteen-man "Product
Safety Advisory Council"5 2 with equal numbers representing government,
47. The section reads as follows: "Compliance with consumer product safety rules
or other rules or orders under this Act shall not relieve any person from liability at
common law or under State statutory law to any other person." It should be noted
that damages received are in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other remedies pro-
vided by law, i.e., the traditional products liability suits.
48. Id. The implication is, of course, that such evidence can be admitted in
certain cases.
49. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, PROPOSED CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY
ACT § 30.
50. See the Nader statement, House Hearings 907.
51. See generally, 118 CONG. REc. 8572 (daily ed., Sept. 20, 1972).
52. Act, § 28(a).
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business, and the consumer. The council may propose safety rules, and gen-
erally serves in an advisory capacity for the Commission.
V. Conclusion
The creation of the new Commission represents a significant and sorely
needed first step in protecting the consuming public.5 3 The Act's passage
signifies a departure from the traditional, piecemeal approach to consumer
protection to a consolidated federal response. By an assertive step, Congress
deprived the President of exclusive budgetary control over the Commission
by requiring that it also receive all budget requests or legislative recommenda-
tions submitted to the President. 54 At the very least, this requirement ensures
the continuous existence of the Commission and checks any attempt by the
President to dismantle it or assimilate its function within another agency.
While this may prevent the Commission from functioning exclusively at the
whim of the President, it could also subject the agency to partisan haggling.
While the Act might be an innovative achievement, limitations on the Com-
mission's authority can be viewed as remnants of the old reluctance to allow
a single federal entity too much clout over private industry. This reluctance
can best be seen in the unwillingness of Congress to include all consumer prod-
ucts within the reach of the Act. By exempting certain product categories55
from control, Congress may have seriously hampered the Commission's effec-
tiveness. The Congress appointed the NCPS which painstakingly outlined
what needed to be done and how to do it, yet many of its essential recommen-
dations were never implemented. Examples of this deliberate weakening of
the Commission's power are: the requirement, in most cases, that the agency
be subjected to the political considerations of the Justice Department
prior to proceeding in court; that the Commission obtain court approval be-
fore acting against certain products; and that judicial review be based on the
broader "substantial evidence" test. These are hardly the trappings of a
truly independent agency.
It must be conceded, however, that a stronger bill, like the one which
passed the Senate, would never have been acceptable to the House or to the
President. Thus, while the Commission's authority and power may not be as
strong and pervasive as some would like, its very existence is a hopeful be-
ginning.
David M. Pantalena
53. See generally THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE CONSUMER PRODUCT
SAFETY ACT (1973).
54. Act, § 27(j) and (k). See also Act, § 32(b).
55. See note 33, supra.
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